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Prior research has shown that young infants understand something about others’ 
goals. This understanding has been developmentally linked to infants’ own actions. 
An open question is what aspects of experience are crucial to action understanding. In 
the current studies, we sought to examine the relation between experience and action 
understanding in 3-month-old infants and to investigate the differential effects of 
active and passive experience. Findings from Study 1 demonstrated a threshold effect: 
a minimal amount of active experience led to subsequent action understanding. In 
Study 2, we assessed whether visual experience alone would have the same effect by 
giving another group of infants matched passive experience. These infants, however, 
did not reap the same benefits from passive experience. These findings demonstrate 
that active experience provides important information, above and beyond that which 
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An understanding of the intentions of others is an essential aspect of what 
makes humans a unique species. As social beings, an understanding of others’ goal-
directed actions is essential to our social, cognitive, and language development. For 
example, in early word-learning, infants must be able to form associations between 
seemingly arbitrary sounds and objects or actions around them. Without the ability to 
understand the intention of another individual in referring to a particular object during 
a labeling instance, learning language would be impossible. An understanding of 
others’ intentions guides infants’ learning not only in word-learning, but also in social 
referencing and imitation (Baldwin & Moses, 1996; Meltzoff, 1995; Tomasello, 
1999). Deficits in understanding others are devastating to both social life and social 
learning, as can be seen in the case of autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
A burgeoning literature spanning several laboratories and paradigms provide 
converging evidence that typically developing infants possess this critical 
understanding of others’ actions as goal-directed within the first year of life (see 
Woodward, 2005 for summary). Initial evidence for this understanding comes from 
experiments using visual habituation paradigms. In this now classic paradigm, infants 
are habituated to (repeatedly shown) events involving an agent acting on an object. 
Within the first 12 months, infants demonstrate novelty preferences for changes in 
goal-relations but not changes in physical-relations, suggesting that they view the 
goal-directed nature of the interaction between agent and object as more salient than 
the physical aspects of the event (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995; 




eye-tracking, imitation, and other overt responses) provide further evidence that 
infants view others’ actions as structured by goals within the first year (Behne, 
Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Falck-Yttr, Gredeback, & von Hofsten, 2006; 
Hamlin, Hallinan, & Woodward, in press; Luo & Baillargeon, 2007). 
The fact that this crucial understanding is present early in life makes the 
assumption that it is strongly driven by innate capacities an intriguing possibility. 
Indeed, several current accounts stress the contributions of innate structures in action 
understanding (e.g., Biro & Leslie, 2006; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Kiraly, Jovanovic, 
Prinz, Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003). It is also possible, however, that this early 
and essential understanding may be influenced by components of experience that are 
universal and present early in life. In fact, dependence on reliably present experiences 
for typically developing abilities is a common developmental mechanism across 
many species (Greenough, Black, & Wallace, 1987). One way important experiences 
can be dependably present is if the developing organism produces the experiences 
itself. A classic example of the necessity of self-produced actions for understanding 
others is evidenced in research by Gottlieb (1975, 1991) demonstrating that ducklings 
require the experience of producing a peep in order to perceive maternal calls 
(devocalized ducklings did not respond specifically to their mother’s call). Examples 
like this raise the question of whether early self-produced experiences help shape 
infants’ perception of goal-directed actions.  
The notion that first-person agentive experience plays an important role in 
action understanding has been in place for over a century (Baldwin, 1897; Piaget, 




2005; Tomasello, 1999; Woodward, 2005). Recent findings of mirror neurons in 
monkeys and mirror systems in humans indicating a direct neural link between action 
production and action understanding have led to renewed interest in this relationship 
and its importance in development (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Gangitano, 
Mottaghy, & Pascual-Leone, 2001; Gerson & Woodward, in press; Grezes & Decety, 
2001; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti & Fadiga, 1998). Although several 
perspectives note the important contributions of first-person experience, the specific 
mechanisms by which self-produced actions play a role in action understanding are 
currently unknown. 
On a basic level, producing actions oneself allows an individual to view the 
outcomes of these events and the statistical regularities that occur when particular 
actions are produced. In fact, past research has shown that infants under two years of 
age attend uniquely to the effects of actions and are able to extract statistical 
regularities relating to goals in events (Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark, 2001; Kiraly 
et al., 2003; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). In this way, self-produced action is a 
salient way for an individual to learn about actions in the same way he or she may 
learn through observational experience. 
Beyond this, however, it is possible that first-person agentive experience 
provides unique information that is not attainable from passive observation. An 
individual must have a representation of his or her goal in order to successfully 
complete an intentional action that is part of a sequence of events. Thus, experiencing 




Consistent with this view, recent evidence indicates that infants’ own action 
abilities are related to their perception of others’ actions. The first evidence for this 
was circumstantial. Researchers found that infants’ responses to others’ actions as 
goal-directed emerged at around the time these actions emerged in infants themselves 
(Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001). For example, around four or five 
months of age, infants begin to produce well-structured goal-directed reaches 
themselves (Bertenthal & Clifton, 1998; Rochat, 1989) and also begin to understand 
reaches as intentional in others (Woodward, 1998). Following on these observations, 
researchers then looked for more direct evidence for linkages between infants’ action 
production and action understanding.  
One way this link has been examined in more detail is through correlational 
studies. In correlational studies, researchers investigate phenomena at an age when a 
great deal of individual variation exists in the capacity to both produce and 
understand a particular action so that the links between these abilities can be explored 
while accounting for the many confounding factors that likely co-occur with general 
development. For example, between 10 and 12 months of age, a great deal of 
individual variation exists in infants’ ability to both produce and understand means-
end actions, such as pulling a cloth to get a toy. Sommerville and Woodward (2005) 
compared the individual differences in infants’ understanding of the goal structure of 
a cloth-pulling sequence and their ability to produce a well-organized cloth-pulling 
action to attain a toy. They found a correlation such that infants who were better able 
to produce planful cloth-pulling actions understood the end-goal of another’s cloth-




those infants who were unable to produce planful actions understood the 
experimenter’s goal as the cloth (thus, they understood a simpler goal sequence in this 
event). Additional correlations have been found between infants’ ability to produce 
and understand pointing (Brune & Woodward, 2007; Woodward & Guajardo, 2002).  
This evidence supports the notion that the production and understanding of 
particular actions likely exert an influence on one another in development. In order to 
more closely investigate this possibility and determine the causal direction of this 
link, Sommerville and colleagues (Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005) 
conducted an intervention study with three-month-old infants who are not proficient 
with their reaches and also do not understand the goal-directed nature of another’s 
reach. In this study, three-month-olds were fitted with Velcro mittens that enable 
infants of this age to apprehend objects and become more planful with their reaching 
actions (Needham, Barrett, & Peterman, 2002). The key question was whether this 
engagement in object-directed activity would change infants’ perception of others’ 
actions. This study used a habituation paradigm, adapted from Woodward (1998), in 
order to assess infants’ action understanding. Infants were habituated to a mittened 
hand reaching for one of two toys on a stage. After habituation, the placement of the 
two toys was switched and infants saw alternating trials in which the hand either 
reached for the same toy in a new place (old-goal trials) or a new toy in the same 
place (new-goal trials). Longer looking to new-goal trials indicated that infants 
interpreted the change in relation between the hand and the object as more novel than 
the change in physical motion. Infants with experience manipulating toys using 




they understood the relation between the experimenter and the object of her reach. 
This pattern of responses in the habituation paradigm is similar to that of older infants 
who have been shown to understand this relationship (Woodward 1998, 1999). 
Infants who did not have experience with mittens prior to habituation, however, did 
not show this same pattern - they did not differentiate between test trials in the 
habituation paradigm, consistent with previous findings with infants of this age 
(Sommerville et al., 2005). 
In addition, the training with Velcro mittens, and not their experience outside 
of the laboratory, led the infants to understand the actor’s goal in habituation. This 
was indicated by a correlation between object-directed activity with mittens and 
looking times in habituation, such that infants who were more active with the mittens 
looked relatively longer at the new-goal trials. No such correlation between 
barehanded activity (assessing abilities before training) and habituation times was 
found.  
This study (Sommerville et al., 2005) provided the first evidence that first-
person experience affects perception of others’ actions. One limitation of this study, 
however, is that it did not differentiate between what the infants gained from 
observation of their actions and what was truly unique to their active experience. 
Considering this, some researchers have argued that the knowledge gained from this 
experience could have been due to infants’ observation of their actions, rather than 
having been unique to active experience (Biro & Leslie, 2006).  
In order to determine whether the self-produced nature of these actions was 




experience. A recent study by Sommerville, Hildebrand and Crane (in press) 
differentiated between these two possibilities in older infants. This study built upon 
the correlational evidence linking the production and understanding of means-ends 
actions in the Sommerville and Woodward (2005) study. One group of 10-month-old 
infants was trained to use a cane to reach for a toy. A second group of infants (of the 
same age) passively observed an experimenter training another individual to produce 
this action. In this condition, infants saw a set number of trials equal to the average 
number of trials experienced by infants in the active condition. After this training 
session, infants participated in a habituation paradigm in order to assess their 
understanding of the ultimate goal of the sequence. Infants trained to use a cane to 
pull a toy showed evidence of representing the ultimate goal of the cane-pulling 
sequence in the habituation paradigm, whereas infants who simply observed the cane-
pulling training session did not. Additionally, there was a correlation between infants’ 
ability to produce the action in training (their active experience) and their looking 
times during habituation, such that those infants better able to produce the cane-
pulling action looked relatively longer at the new-toy trials in the habituation 
paradigm. Whether any similar relation between amount of passive experience and 
action understanding was present could not be assessed since all infants in the 
observation condition received roughly the same amount of experience.  
This study by Sommerville and colleagues (in press) demonstrated that active 
experience uniquely influenced 10-month-old infants’ understanding of the intentions 
behind a means-end action. This does not address, however, whether the same is true 




importance of self-produced experience at a time when both motor and conceptual 
abilities are extremely limited. It is currently unknown whether self-produced 
experiences become important once basic skills are already in place or if they are 
essential from the onset. This is the question that motivates the current studies.  
In order to examine the origins of intention understanding, we first sought to 
replicate the Sommerville, Woodward, and Needham (2005) study and gain more 
information about the nature of the relationship between active experience and action 
understanding. By doing so, we investigate the robustness of this effect and gain 
further insight into the mechanisms driving this relationship. In Study 1, two groups 
of three-month-old infants participated in both a training session and a habituation 
paradigm. Infants in the active condition were given experience producing object-
directed actions with Velcro mittens during a training session, thus providing a direct 
replication of the study by Sommerville and colleagues (2005) study. Infants in the 
control condition were given the opportunity to interact with toys using their bare 
hands but received no training with mittens. This study offers a direct investigation of 
the relation between active experience and infants’ subsequent responses.  
In order to clarify whether first person experience is necessary for the effects 
on infants’ action perception, however, a critical test was to provide closely matched 
observational experience. Thus, in Study 2, we test whether effects of experience 
were uniquely derived from first-person experience or from the observation of these 
actions. To this end, the findings from Study 1 were used as a model for the matched 
passive experience in Study 2. That is, we used a yoked observation paradigm in 




the observational experience received by infants in Study 2. We then compared across 
these studies in order to better understand how these different kinds of experiences 




A total of 48 full-term three-month-old infants participated in Study 1. Infants 
ranged in age from three months to four months (mean age = 3 months, 14 days). 
Twenty-four infants were female. The infants were all full term (at least 37 weeks 
gestational age) and recruited from the Washington, DC metro area using a database 
created through mailings and advertisements. The sample of infants was 8% 
Hispanic, 2% Asian, 17% African-American, 46% Caucasian, and 27% multiracial or 
unreported. Twenty-four infants took part in each of the conditions (active and 
control).  
All infants who completed at least one pair of test trials were included in final 
analyses. An additional 34 infants began the procedure but were not included in the 
dataset because of crying or failure to complete at least one pair of test trials in the 
habituation paradigm (n  =  21), procedure error (n  =  10), or failure to produce any 
actions with mittens (n  =  3).  
(b) Procedure 
The study consisted of two phases. Infants in each of the conditions always 




training differed for infants in the two conditions; however, the habituation paradigm 
was identical for both conditions. 
(i) Training Phase 
 During the training phase (i.e., action task), infants sat on a parent’s lap. A 
small white table was at their torso level and parents were asked to support their 
children around the torso so that the infants could easily reach their hands in front of 
them and onto the table. A camera sat directly in front of the table and level with the 
infant.  
Barehanded pre-exposure. To start, infants in both conditions were introduced 
to the experimental toys on the tabletop and given the opportunity to act on them with 
their bare hands. This barehanded pre-exposure provided a measure of infants’ 
reaching skill without the mittens. The experimenter (E1) placed a small bear (five 
inches in length) and a small ball (two inches in diameter), both covered in Velcro, a 
few inches apart from one another in the center of the table, within arm’s reach of the 
infant. During the three-minute session, the experimenter ensured that the infant’s 
hands were on top of the table and drew the infant’s attention to the toys by tapping 
on the table or moving the toys periodically. Following this pre-exposure, the training 
phase ended for infants in the control condition; infants in the active condition then 
received mittened training.  
Active mittens training. In this session, the experimenter fitted the infant with 
Velcro mittens after the barehanded session. The experimenter ensured that the 
infant’s hands were on top of the table and drew the infant’s attention to the toys if he 




allowed the infant to hold it until he or she lost eye contact with the toy. The 
experimenter then detached the toy from the infant’s mitten and drew his or her 
attention back to the toys. This session lasted between three and five minutes. 
(ii) Habituation Phase 
Immediately following the training phase, all infants were tested in a 
habituation procedure modeled after that used by Sommerville and colleagues (2005) 
and designed to assess infants’ encoding of reaching actions as goal-directed. This 
task took place in a different room, equipped with a testing booth and cameras to 
record the event and the view of the infant. During this task, infants sat on a parent’s 
lap and faced a stage holding a bigger version of the ball and bear from the action 
task. Parents were asked not to talk or point when the curtain was lowered so as not to 
influence their infant’s looking in any way. Further, they were asked to look at their 
infant, rather than the event, during the test trials in order to prevent any subconscious 
influencing.  
The camera view of the infant was sent to an online coder who sat in another 
room. The coder was unaware of the order of events and was thus unbiased. She was 
trained to judge whether the baby was looking at the event during each of the trials. 
All trials were infant-controlled. Trials ended when infants looked away for two 
consecutive seconds or looked for a maximum of 120 seconds.  
During habituation trials, the presenter, who sat to the side of the stage out of 
the child’s view, reached out her hand, wearing a large Velcro mitten, and placed her 
hand in front of one of the two toys, as if grasping it (see Figure 1). Once the 




the curtain was raised. Habituation trials were repeated until the infant was habituated 
(when the length of the last three trials was less than half of the length of the first 
three trials) or for 14 trials.  
After habituation, the presenter switched the placement of the two toys on the 
stage while the curtain was raised. One familiarization trial occurred in which the 
infant saw the new placement of the toys without any action. Infants were then shown 
six test events that alternated between new-goal and old-goal events. In the new-goal 
event, the presenter reached for a new toy (the toy that was then in the same position 
as the toy she had reached for in habituation). In the old-goal event, she reached for 
the same toy as in habituation (this toy was then in a new place on the stage). In both 
of these events, the presenter held her arm in position until the end of the trial. The 
toy grasped in habituation, whether the habituation reach was for the far or near toy, 
and the order of test trials was counterbalanced across infants. These factors were 
yoked for infants of similar age and gender across conditions so that each infant in the 
active condition had a matched pair in the control condition. 
 
Figure 1. Infants were habituated to a mittened hand reaching for one of the two toys 
on the stage (A). In test trials, infants saw the hand reach for a new toy in the same 





(i) Action Task 
A trained coder used a digital coding program (Mangold, 1998) to code the 
training session for the amount of time the infant spent looking at and touching each 
of the objects. In order to obtain a measure indicating the extent to which infants 
engaged in object-directed activity, the amount of time each infant spent 
simultaneously looking at and touching the same object (s) was extracted for both the 
barehanded and mittened activity. This measure of visual attention in coordination 
with manual contact as an indication of object-directed activity is both theoretically 
compelling and in following the procedure used by Sommerville et al. (2005). 
Twenty-five percent of the sessions were randomly chosen for reliability coding. The 
time spent in object-directed activity according to the two coders was correlated, (r = 
.98  , P < .001). 
(ii) Habituation Paradigm 
Infants’ looking times to the habituation, familiarization, and test events were 
coded on-line using a coding program (Casstevens, 2007; Pinto, 1994). A second 
trained coder reliability coded all of the sessions. The length of test trials according to 
the two coders was correlated (r  =  .96, p  <  .001).1. As a more stringent test, the 
proportion of test trials in which the online and reliability coders were in agreement 
as to the infant’s look away that ended the trial was recorded. Coders agreed on the 
end of the test trials 88% of the time in the active condition and 76% of the time in 
the control condition. This analysis allowed us to consider whether the direction of 




to the hypothesis (longer looking to new-goal than old-goal test trials), (Fisher’s exact 
test, ns).  
Results and Discussion 
(a) Preliminary Analyses 
  Infants in the active and control conditions reached habituation in an average 
of 9.4 and 9.6 trials, respectively. Due to positive skew in the data, all looking times 
were log transformed before being entered into analyses. A repeated measures 
analysis of variance with the habituation trials (first three and last three habituation 
trials) as the within subjects factor and condition as the between subjects factor 
indicated that infants’ looking times declined across habituation trials for both groups 
(F (5, 42)  =  9.23, p  <  .001) and decrease in looking time did not differ as a function 
of condition (F (5, 42)  =  1.66, ns). Thus, infants in the two conditions demonstrated 
similar levels of attention prior to test trials. 
In addition, a paired samples t-test revealed no difference in barehanded 
activity between infants in the two conditions (t (23)  =  .13, p  = ns). This indicates 
that infants in the two conditions were comparable in ability to produce object-
directed actions prior to any training with mittens. It also verifies that any differential 
effects found between groups were not due solely to barehanded experience in the 
laboratory prior to the habituation paradigm. 
(b) Infants’ Responses on Test Trials 
 The focal question of this study was whether responses in test trials (and thus, 




analyses revealed that differences in infants’ responses to the two types of test trials 
did not vary significantly over trial pairs. Therefore, infants’ average looking times to 
new-goal and old-goal trials were used as the dependent variable in the main 
analyses. The nature of our design allowed us to account for all counterbalanced 
factors (i.e., age, sex, near or far reach in habituation, goal toy in habituation, and first 
test trial) with the yoking variable. A repeated measures analysis of variance with 
test-trial type (old-goal or new-goal) as the within subjects factor and condition 
(active or control) and yoking as the between subjects factors revealed a marginal 
interaction between test-trial type and condition (F (1, 23)  =  2.83, p  =  .11), 
suggesting that infants in the two conditions responded differently to test events in the 
habituation paradigm. This analysis did not reveal a main effect of test-trial type or an 
interaction between test-trial type and yoking.  
Our main hypotheses concerned the effects of experience within the active 
condition. Therefore, we next consider the relationship between active experience and 
action understanding more closely.  
(i) Active Condition 
 Preliminary analyses revealed no interactions between test-trial type and age, 
sex, goal toy in habituation, or first test trial. Therefore, subsequent analyses were 
collapsed across these factors.  
In order to examine the effects of experience, a repeated measures analysis of 
variance with test trial type (old-goal or new-goal) as the within subjects factor and a 
median split of active experience (above or below median amount of active 




revealed no significant main effect of test trial type (F (1, 20)  =  2.49, p  =  .13; see 
Table 1 for looking times), but revealed an interaction between test trial type and 
active experience (F (1,20)  =  7.62, p  <  .02). Follow-up paired samples t-tests 
revealed that infants with below-median experience did not differentiate between new 
and old-goal test trials (t (11)  =  .67, p  =  ns; median looking times to old-goal and 
new-goal test trials were 9.79s and 10.34s, respectively), whereas infants with above-
median experience looked significantly longer to new-goal test trials than old-goal 
test trials (t (11)  =  2.53, p  <  .03; median looking times to old-goal and new-goal 
test trials were 3.20s and 7.62s, respectively). In addition, there was a type by 
habituation reach interaction (F (1,20) = 7.62, p < .02). Inspection of the means 
indicated that infants tended to look longer to test events when they saw a far reach 
than a near reach.  













Active (N = 24)   Active (N = 20)   
Median 7.09 9.16 Median 4.98 9.16* 
Mean 13.12 13.45 Mean 9.20 12.70 
Standard Error 3.36 2.86 Standard Error 2.74 3.07 
Observation (N = 24)   Observation (N = 20)   
Median 5.41 6.56 Median 5.41 6.56 
Mean  8.93 9.79 Mean 8.25 10.08 
Standard Error 1.81 2.00 Standard Error 1.67 2.34 
Control (N = 24)   Control (N = 20)   
Median 6.07 5.70 Median 8.41 6.49 
Mean 9.59 7.31 Mean 11.11 8.15 
Standard Error 1.95 1.33  Standard Error 2.19 1.53 
 




In order to explore the relation between active experience and action 
understanding in more detail, we next conducted regression analyses. We first created 
a single score indicating infants’ relative preference for new-goal test trials compared 
to old-goal trials: (average looking time to new-goal test events)/(average looking 
time to new-goal test events + average looking time to old-goal test events). This 
score isolates the extent to which infants preferred the new-goal test trials 
independent of individual differences in base rates of looking.2 
A Spearman rank correlation revealed a correlation between relative 
preference for new-goal test trials and amount of active experience, r  =  .42, p  < .05. 
These findings replicate the relation between active experience and action 
understanding found in Sommerville et al. (2005) and demonstrate that training with 
Velcro mittens led to an increased sensitivity to the goal-directed nature of another’s 
reach. There was no correlation between their looking times and their barehanded 
experience (r  =  -.03, p  =  ns), indicating that ability to produce object-directed 
reaches prior to training (as measured by barehanded experience) did not influence 
infants’ looking to test trials.  
 Inspection of the scatterplot (see Figure 2) suggested that the relation between 
experience and action understanding is not best explained by a linear relationship. 
Curve fitting regression analyses revealed that the relationship between the relative 
preference for new-goal trials and active experience was better accounted for by a 
logarithmic function (R2 = .25, p < .02) than by a linear function (R2 = .16, p = .05). 




threshold is met, relative differences in experience are less important to responses in 
the habituation paradigm. 
 
Figure 2. Relation Active Experience and Looking Times. 
 
Due to the logarithmic relationship between infants’ active experience and 
their preference for new-goal test trials and the fact that we were interested in those 
infants who received sufficient experience, we also separately examined those infants 
whose active experience was in the upper 75th percentile. This distinction 
corresponded with a cutoff such that infants in the top 75th percentile produced over 
45 seconds of object-directed activity, whereas those in the lower 25th percentile 




a paired samples t-test revealed a significant difference between looking to old- and 
new-goal test trials (t (19)  =  2.53, p  < .03) such that infants looked longer to new-
goal than old-goal trials (see Table 1 for looking times). Within this group of 20 
infants, 15 infants looked longer at the new-goal test trials (p < .05 by sign test).  
(ii) Control Condition 
Preliminary analyses revealed no interactions between test-trial type and any 
counterbalancing factors. Therefore, remaining analyses were collapsed across all 
counterbalancing factors. A paired samples t-test revealed no significant differences 
between looking times to old- and new-goal test trials (t (23) = 1.01, ns). Therefore, 
looking during test trials did not seem to be strongly influenced by test-trial type or 
any other factors in this condition.  
 A Spearman’s rank order correlation revealed no relationship between infants’ 
barehanded activity and their relative preference for new-goal test trials (r  =  -.034, p  
=  ns). This indicates that looking during test trials was not influenced by infants’ 
ability to perform object-directed reaches prior to their experiences at the laboratory. 
It also demonstrates that their experience producing barehanded actions in the 
laboratory did not influence their looking to test trials in the habituation paradigm. 
As a further analysis, we selected those 20 infants in the control condition 
who were yoked (and were thus matched for experience in the habituation paradigm, 
as well as age and gender) to those infants in the active condition who produced the 
upper 75th percentile of active experience. In the 20 matched control infants, there 
was no preference for either old- or new-goal test trials (t (19) = 1.56, ns). Seven of 




In order to assess whether there was an interaction between condition and 
looking times to test trials in this group of matched infants, we conducted a repeated 
measures analysis of variance with test trial type (old-goal or new-goal) as the within 
subjects factor and condition (active or control) as the between subjects factor. This 
revealed a type by condition interaction (F (1,38) = 8.35, p < .01). In sum, infants in 
the active condition who received sufficient experience demonstrated a reliable 
preference for new-goal test trials, whereas matched infants in the control condition 
showed no such preference. 
In summary, Study 1 demonstrated that infants who received sufficient 
training producing object-directed activity with Velcro mittens showed a selective 
novelty response to goal change events, and thus understood another’s reach as goal-
directed. In accord with previous research, the amount of active experience 
influenced infants’ looking to test events. Further, this study shed light on the nature 
of the logarithmic, rather than linear, relation between these two factors, suggesting 
that a minimal amount of experience is necessary for conceptual change, after which 
relative amounts of experience are not particularly influential. This study also 
provides a foundation for answering the vital question of the effects of observation, 
which we examine in Study 2. 
Study 2 
Study 2 was designed to address several remaining questions concerning the 
influence of experience on infants’ intention understanding. This study aimed to 
determine whether infants who receive passive experience with mittens would 




was designed so that infants’ amount of passive experience was yoked to the active 
experience of infants in the active condition from Study 1. This design allowed us to 
examine whether there was a similar relationship between passive experience and 
action understanding.  
Findings from this study contribute to the examination of the origins of 
intention understanding in unique ways. They directly inform our understanding of 
the relative contributions of innate factors and experience. According to one 
perspective, the understanding infants gained from experience in Sommerville and 
colleagues’ (2005) study could have been a function of the perceptual cues inherent in 
infants’ actions while wearing the Velcro mittens (Biro & Leslie, 2006). If this were 
true, we would expect passive experience to produce the same effects (demonstration 
of action understanding in the habituation paradigm) as active experience. In contrast, 
if only the infants in the active condition, and not those in the observation condition, 
understand the goal of an actor’s grasp in habituation, this would support theories 
proposing that active experience is vital to action understanding at the onset. 
Methods 
(a) Participants 
Twenty-four three-month-old infants were included in our final data set. 
Infants ranged in age from three months, one day to four months, zero days (mean 
age = 3 months, 14 days). Twelve infants were female. As in Study 1, the infants 
were all full term (at least 37 weeks gestational age) and from the Washington, DC 




Hispanic, 8% Asian, 25% African-American, 38% Caucasian, and 21% multiracial or 
unreported.   
All infants who completed at least one pair of test trials were included in final 
analyses. An additional 16 infants began the procedure but were not included in the 
dataset because of crying or failure to complete at least one pair of test trials in the 
habituation paradigm (n = 13) or procedure error (n = 3).  
(b) Procedure 
This study consisted of two tasks. Infants always participated in the 
observation training before the habituation paradigm. All aspects of the procedure 
were identical to Study 1, except for the training phase that followed barehanded pre-
exposure. 
(i) Observation Mittens Training 
Following the barehanded pre-exposure session, infants participated in an 
observation training session. The goal of the observation training session was to 
match active experience of infants in the active condition in Study 1 as closely as 
possible to the passive experience (measured as the time spent watching an 
experimenter engage in object-directed activity) of infants in the observation 
condition in this study. In order to achieve this goal, infants in the observation 
condition were yoked to infants in the active training condition of similar age and 
gender, in order to control for any confounding factors of age or gender. The amount 
of time each infant spent in object-directed activity (as coded in Study 1) was rounded 
up by approximately five seconds in order to create a script that ensured that the 




minimum. We recognize that exact matching is difficult, so we erred on the side of 
giving infants in the observation condition more experience.  
During the training session, E1 wore a large Velcro mitten and placed the toys 
just out of reach of the infant. A second experimenter (E2) stood in a neighboring 
room and told E1 which toy to touch with the mitten first according to the script. The 
order in which the experimenter touched each of the objects was randomized. While 
E1 moved the toy around on the table with the mitten, a third experimenter (E3) 
watched the infant through a two-way mirror and told E2 when the infant was gazing 
at the toy that E1 was touching with the mitten. E2 used a stopwatch to measure the 
length of time the infant spent looking at the toy E1 was moving with the mitten. She 
told E1 when to touch which object based upon the predetermined script. Throughout 
this session, E1 used her unmittened hand to tap on the table in order to draw the 
infant’s attention to the action when he or she was distracted. 
Observation sessions were coded for the amount of time the infant spent 
watching the toys and the amount of time the experimenter spent touching each of the 
toys. The time infants spent watching the toy the experimenter was touching was then 
extracted in order to ensure that the script was accurately followed and to generate an 
estimate, for each infant, of the amount of visual experience they actually received. 
Twenty-five percent of these sessions were reliability coded and the time spent 
viewing object-directed activity according to the two coders was correlated, (r  = .9 , 
p < .001). As mentioned above, we erred on the side of giving infants in the 
observation condition more experience than infants in the active condition (Mean 




respectively). Infants’ passive experience in this study was correlated with infants’ 
active experience in Study 1 (r = .90, p < .001), demonstrating that the infants’ 
experience was successfully yoked.  
(ii) Habituation Paradigm 
Immediately following the training phase, infants in this experiment 
participated in the exact same habituation paradigm as infants in Study 1. Infants in 
the observation condition viewed an identical configuration of the habituation 
paradigm as their yoked partner (i.e., same placement of toys, direction of reach, and 
first test trial). Coding of all sessions was done both online and by a reliability coder. 
The length of test trials according to the two coders was correlated (r  =  .90, p  <  
.001).1 As a more stringent test, the proportion of trials on which the two coders 
agreed on the end of the trial was 79%. In addition, the direction of the disagreements 
was analyzed in order to assess for any possible bias in the coding. Disagreements 
were randomly distributed with respect to the hypothesis (longer looking to new-goal 
than old-goal test trials; Fisher’s exact test, ns).  
Results and Discussion 
 
Infants reached habituation in an average of 9.25 trials A repeated measures 
analysis of variance with habituation trials (the first three and last three habituation 
trials) as the within subjects factor indicated that infants’ looking times declined 
across habituation trials (F (5,19) = 8.37, p < .001).  
As in Study 1, the dependent variable was the average looking time to old- 




between counterbalanced factors and test-trial type. Therefore, remaining analyses 
were collapsed across these factors.  
In order to examine the effects of passive experience, a repeated measures 
analysis of variance with test-trial type (old-goal or new-goal) as the within subjects 
factor and a median split of passive experience (above or below median amount of 
passive experience) as the between subjects factor revealed no main effect of test-trial 
type (old-goal or new-goal), (F (1,22) = .03, ns; see Table 1 for looking times), and 
no interaction between test-trial type and passive experience (F (1,22) = .09, ns).  
 To further test whether there was any relation between passive experience and 
action understanding, we created a single proportion score indicating infants’ measure 
of relative preference for new-goal test trials. A Spearman’s rank correlation revealed 
no significant correlation between relative preference for new-goal test trials and 
infants’ passive experience (r = .08, ns). Follow up curve fitting analyses 
demonstrated that neither a linear function (R2 = .02, ns) nor a logarithmic function 
(R2 = .02, ns) indicated any relationship between passive experience and action 
understanding (see Figure 3). There was also no correlation between their looking 





Figure 3. Relation Between Passive Experience and Looking Times. 
We also separately examined those infants who were yoked to the 20 infants 
in the active condition from Study 1 with the highest amount of active experience. 
Due to the design of the study, these were also the infants with the upper 75th 
percentile of passive experience. In this group of 20 infants, a paired samples t-test 
revealed no significant difference between looking times to old- and new-goal test-
trials (t (19) = .28, ns). Only those infants whose average looking times to old- and 
new-goal test-trials differed by more than a second were analyzed in a sign test (due 
to the fact that less than one second difference in average looking was likely due to 




(a) Comparison of Three Conditions 
Based on the findings from Study 1, final analyses compared infants with the 
top 75th percentile of active experience, infants with the top 75th percentile of passive 
experience, and the 20 matched infants in the control condition. In order to ensure 
that the infants in each of these conditions did not differ from one another in their 
attention to events during habituation or in their ability to produce object-directed 
actions prior to training, we conducted some preliminary analyses. A repeated 
measures analysis of variance with the habituation trials (first three and last three 
habituation trials) as the within subjects factor and condition (active, observation, or 
control) as the between subjects factor indicated that infants’ looking times declined 
across habituation trials for all groups (F (5,53) = 13.35, p < .001) and decrease in 
looking time did not differ as a function of condition (F (10,108) = .89, ns), indicating 
no difference in attention prior to test events across conditions. A one-way analysis of 
variance with barehanded activity as the dependent variable and condition as the 
factor revealed no difference between the three groups in their barehanded activity (F 
(2,57) = .95, ns).  
A univariate analysis of variance with relative preference for new-goal test-
trials (as indicated by the proportion score noted above) as the dependent variable and 
condition as a fixed factor revealed a significant effect of condition, F (2,57) = 4.53, p 
< .02 (see Table 1 for looking times). Planned comparisons were conducted to follow 
up on these interactions. Paired sampled t-tests based on the matching of infants 
across conditions revealed that the active and control conditions differed significantly 




between observation and active conditions in preference for new-goal trials 
approached significance (t (19) = 2.07, p = .05). There was no significant difference 
between the observation and control conditions (t (19) = 1.31, p = .20).  
 In summary, Study 2 was designed to directly address the effects of passive 
experience on infants’ developing action understanding. Results from this study failed 
to reveal any effect of passive experience on infants’ understanding of a reach as 
goal-directed. None of the relations between active experience and looking times 
found in the active condition in Study 1 were replicated in this study with passive 
experience. Comparisons between this study and both conditions from Study 1 
revealed that general responses of infants in the observation condition were more 
similar to infants in the control condition than the active condition.  
General Discussion 
 The goal of these studies was to examine the effects of both active and passive 
experience on three-month-old infants’ action understanding. Results from the control 
condition in Study 1 verified that, without experience producing object-directed 
actions with mittens, infants of this age do not view a mittened reach as object-
directed. The active condition in Study 1 demonstrated that active experience leads 
infants of this age to understand another’s grasp as goal-directed. The relationship 
between amount of active experience and action understanding replicated previous 
findings (Sommerville et al., 2005). Furthermore, this study shed new light on the 
relation between these two factors. The logarithmic function of the relationship 




threshold effect. Infants who received sufficient experience with mittens then 
understood another’s grasp as goal-directed.  
In Study 2, an additional group of infants received matched passive 
experience, undergoing training derived directly from the activity of infants in Study 
1, in order to differentiate between the effects of active and passive experience. This 
study differs from previously conducted research in two important ways. First, it 
differs from the Sommerville et al. (2005) study in that it examines the unique 
contributions of active experience to action understanding. As discussed above, there 
are theoretical reasons to believe that active experience may provide a unique source 
of information. Although work by Sommerville and colleagues (in press) further 
supports this notion, the possibility that, early in the development of action 
understanding, observation provides information as well cannot be discounted, 
however. 
A second way in which the current research differs from previous studies is 
that it examines the unique contributions of active experience at an age when action 
understanding is first emerging. The study by Sommerville et al. (in press) provides 
initial evidence that active experience uniquely contributes to action understanding. 
This study demonstrated that 10-month-old infants were able to learn about others’ 
intentions in a sequence of actions through active experience but not through passive 
observation. It was unknown, however, whether active experience is uniquely 
important to intention understanding for younger infants. Though 10-month-old 
infants do not understand the end-goal of a means-end action without this active 




(Woodward, 1998). The current study, however, examined three-month-old infants 
who have no foundational understanding of intentions upon which active experience 
can build.  
Findings from our second study did not demonstrate any effect of passive 
experience on three-month-old infants’ action understanding. A comparison of 
matched infants (with the top 75th percentile of experience) in the three conditions 
revealed a significant difference in looking time patterns as a function of condition. 
Study 1 demonstrated that infants without any experience with mittens did not 
understand another’s action as goal-directed at this age. Study 2 revealed that, unlike 
active experience, passive experience did not influence infants’ subsequent attention 
to the test events. Further, there was no hint of a threshold effect of passive 
experience (as was demonstrated in the active group in Study 1). In fact, even in 
considering those infants who received the highest amounts of passive experience, 
there was no consistency in their understanding of another’s action (see Figure 3). In 
addition, in our studies, it could not have been that infants were simply more attentive 
to their own actions than another’s, because our procedure ensured that infants in the 
observation condition were actively engaged throughout the session (only the time 
infants spent watching the mittened actions was counted as passive experience). The 
fact that active experience had a powerful effect above and beyond perceptual 
experience directly contradicts claims by Biro and Leslie (2006) that the knowledge 
gained by infants in Sommerville and colleagues’ (2005) study was a function of 




 Whether active experience is qualitatively or quantitatively different from 
passive experience is an open question. In principle, it is possible that greater 
amounts of observational experience could influence infants’ understanding of others’ 
actions. Our findings do not rule out the possibility that observational experience is 
informative in later stages of development. In fact, we believe initial knowledge 
gained from active experience can be extended through passive experience and 
analogy (Gerson & Woodward, in press). Nothing in our findings, however, indicates 
that an effect of passive experience is present at this early stage of development.  
Taken together, these findings suggests that active experience has a unique 
effect on infants’ analysis of others’ goal-directed actions. These results raise 
numerous questions concerning the means by which these effects occur. Several 
different proposals exist concerning how this link between self and others could 
occur. Some researchers have suggested a direct link between self and other, in the 
form of shared representations for one’s own and others’ actions (Hauf, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2007; Meltzoff, 2005). This possibility is supported by 
findings indicating that there is a mirror system in humans that provides a direct link 
between action and perception, is selectively sensitive to goal-directed action, and is 
shaped by motor experience (Calvo-Merino, Grezes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 
2006; Grezes & Decety, 2001; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Järveläinen, Schürmann, & Hari, 
2004; Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 2004). In contrast, others 
hypothesize that children extend information from self to others via a process of 
analogical mapping (e.g., Barresi & Moore, 1996). A third possibility is that both of 




(Gerson & Woodward, in press). Future studies should be conducted to explore these 
possibilities. 
An equally important question concerns whether the benefits gained from 
firsthand experience generalize across contexts. What is the range of events to which 
infants can extend their knowledge? Is infants’ initial action understanding specific to 
the particular toys and action or are they broader? The breadth of this initial 
understanding holds great implications for learning and development in this domain. 
Current research in our laboratory is examining these important questions. 
In sum, the current studies provide support for the proposal that self-produced 
actions provide unique information that is vital to the development of action 
understanding (Barresi & Moore, 1996; Gerson & Woodward, in press; Meltzoff, 
2005; Tomasello, 1999; Woodward, 2005). As active agents in their own worlds, 
infants are naturally inclined to act in goal-directed ways, such as reaching for objects 
they intend to obtain, once they have the physical ability (Piaget, 1953; von Hofsten, 
2004). All typically developing infants thus recruit this reliably present experience in 
order to inform their goal perception. In this way, self-produced action, like many 
other species-typical abilities, is an “experience-expectant” (Greenough et al., 1987) 
phenomenon that is necessary for the understanding of other agents’ intentional 
actions. The organism itself (in this case, the human infant) can provide important 
information that guides experience and influences development. Considering the 
importance of experience-expectant processes allows us to move beyond the 
dichotomy between innate and environmental factors in order to more closely 




These findings also highlight the importance of cross-domain research in 
making progress toward our understanding of development. Researchers within the 
fields of motor development and conceptual development generally study progress 
within each of these domains without considering potential contributions from other 
areas of research (but see Cicchino & Rakison, in press; Perone, Madole, Ross-
Sheehy, Carey, & Oakes, in press; von Hofsten, 2004 for some exceptions). Our 
findings demonstrate that the effects of learning in one domain (i.e., motor 
development) can have massive effects on learning in other domains (i.e., conceptual 
development). This type of cross-domain research can and should be extended across 
other areas of study in order to obtain a broader and more accurate view of 
development.  
 To conclude, the studies presented here provide new insights into the role of 
active experience in action understanding and also raise important questions to focus 
new directions of research. This research demonstrates that, at a time when infants are 
first able to understand others’ intentional actions, “what’s in a mitten,” one’s own or 
another’s hand, matters; first-person experience uniquely benefits the understanding 





1. This reliability coding (looking times in test trials) is currently completed for 
eight of the infants in Study 1 and five of the infants in Study 2. This coding is 
ongoing and will be completed for all of the infants in both studies. All other 
reliability coding of these sessions has already been completed for all infants 
in both studies. 
2. Although creating a proportion score raises the potential problem that data are 
non-normal, we conducted all analyses using the log of difference scores, 
which are not confined in the same way, and these analyses supported the 
same conclusions. Therefore, we include analyses using proportion scores as 
this seems an intuitive way to consider the data. 
3. There were no cases in which average looking times to old- and new-goal 
trials did not differ by more than one second in either the active or control 
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